Making a credible promise of peace can actually make war more likely by making you look like you're less willing to fight.
March 26, 2026
Original Paper
The Commitment Trap How Credible Promises Can Increase the Risk of War
SSRN · 6396598
The Takeaway
In international relations, we usually assume that making credible commitments and showing restraint prevents conflict. This paper argues these same policies create 'strategic traps' where rivals interpret peace-seeking as weakness, leading to structural pressures that escalate the likelihood of total war.
From the abstract
<div> Why do policies intended to reduce conflict risk sometimes generate strategic instability? International politics has long relied on strategies such as diplomacy, restraint, asymmetric tactics, and security commitments to manage tensions and avoid escalation. People widely understand these approaches as stabilizing mechanisms within an uncertain international system. </div> <div> <br> </div> <div> This paper argues that such policies can also produce unintended consequences through process