When given a range of possible truths, people don't lie more; they simply feel 'honest' reporting whichever possible number pays them the most.
This behavioral study shows that uncertainty acts as a moral loophole for greed. Instead of inventing lies, people use 'plausible deniability' to pick the best-case scenario within a fuzzy range of facts, allowing them to maximize their income while still viewing themselves as honest actors.
Reporting under Imperfect Information
SSRN · 6502478
We experimentally study how uncertainty about the true state shapes reporting behavior when payoffs increase in the reported outcomes. In a chip-draw experiment, subjects report the number on a randomly drawn chip. In one treatment they observe the number directly, while in the other they observe only a signal that restricts the set of possible values without identifying the true number. We find that imperfect information substantially reshapes the distribution of reports: when the true state is